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Introduction
Mathematics may be characterized as the study of formal relations between properties of
mathematical objects of many different kinds, including the natural numbers.1 From a
mathematician’s perspective, asking questions about the existence or properties of mathematical
objects is equivalent to asking whether these objects fall under a particular mathematical
definition. For example, a number theorist takes for granted that prime numbers2 really exist in
some way, and instead concerns herself with deducing which numbers are prime in a particular
number system. From a philosopher’s perspective, however, questions about mathematical
objects may include ontological questions addressing whether these objects exist as abstract
entities, mental conceptions, or rooted in material objects. Philosophers also ask epistemological
questions concerning our knowledge of mathematical objects. Philosophy of mathematics
addresses a broad range of philosophical issues relating to logic, metaphysics, and
epistemology.3
The philosophy of mathematics has been around at least since the time of Pythagoras.4
Until relatively recently, mathematics was considered to be a philosophical subject. Philosophers
such as Rene Descartes and Gottfried Leibniz debated the ultimate nature of mathematics.5 In the
early 20th century the philosophy of mathematics was arguably the most important topic treated
by philosophers and it continues to be central for many contemporary philosophers.
In this paper I intend to discuss various theories in the philosophy of mathematics
concerning the ontological status of mathematical objects. These theories include logicism,
1

The natural numbers are the set of positive whole numbers: 1, 2, 3, …
A prime number is an integer than can only be divided into evenly by itself and one.
3
Michael Tavuzzi, “Central Problems and Directions in the Philosophy of Mathematics,” 1988, in Nature,
Science & Values, 268
4
C.D.C. Reeve and Patrick Lee Miller, “Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans,” 2006, in Introductory Readings
in Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy, Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing, 4
5
Stewart Shapiro, Thinking about Mathematics: The Philosophy of Mathematics, 2000, Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 3
2
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intuitionism, formalism, platonism, structuralism, and moderate realism. I will also discuss
problems that arise within these theories and attempts to solve them. Finally, I will attempt to
harmonize the best feature of moderate realism and structuralism, presenting a theory that I take
to best describe current mathematical practice.

Logicism
Logicism is the theory that the most fundamental part of mathematics, from which all other parts
can be derived, is reducible to symbolic logic, and can be proven using the laws of logic.6
Gottlob Frege, the founder of logicism, believed that all statements of arithmetic and real
analysis are either laws of logic or can be proven with the laws of logic.7 To justify his belief
Frege developed a symbolic language of logic capable of expressing the basic arithmetical
statements from which all others could be derived.8 His definition of natural numbers begins
with assigning 0 to a concept that does not apply to any object.9 This assignment is appropriate
since such a concept applies to zero objects. He continues, noting that “the number (n+1) applies
to the concept F if there is an object a which falls under F and such that the number n applies to
the concept ‘falling under F but not [identical with] a.’”10 For example, consider an object a
which falls under the concept F, where F is the concept of being a vertex, or point, of a triangle.
There are two other vertices that fall under this concept that are not identical to a. Thus the
number 2+1, as an instance of n+1, applies to F. In defining the natural numbers, Frege also

6

Leon Horsten, “Philosophy of Mathematics,” 2012, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, section 2.1
Shapiro, Thinking about Mathematics, 109
8
Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic: A Logico-mathematical Enquiry into the Concept of
Number, 1884, J.L. Austin (trans), Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1980, cited in Horsten, section 2.1
9
Frege, section 55, 67
10
Ibid.
7
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adopted what George Boolos has called Hume’s principle11—the number of Fs equals the
number of Gs if and only if the Fs and Gs have a one-to-one correspondence.12 In this example
the number of vertices of a triangle is equal to the number of wheels on a tricycle if and only if
each tricycle wheel can be identified with one and only one triangle vertex such that all vertices
have a corresponding wheel. Using his definition of the natural numbers and Hume’s principle,
Frege attempted to derive the foundations of arithmetic.13
In the process of defining natural numbers, Frege noticed that he has supplied no means
by which to differentiate numbers from other objects. For example, there is no logical reason
why Julius Caesar cannot be classified as a number in the same way that zero can.14 He solved
this “Caesar objection” by stipulating a way to distinguish numbers from non-numerical objects:
“the number which applies to the concept F is the extension of the concept ‘equinumerous with
the concept F.’”15 Here, an extension of a concept is a set that contains all of the objects to which
the concept applies. Thus, the number three is defined as the set of all concepts, such as tricycle
wheels and triangle vertices, under which exactly three objects fall—the set of all triples. Using
this definition and the properties of extensions, Frege was able to rewrite Hume’s principle so
that the Caesar problem no longer arises. The result, which Frege calls Basic Law V, is
paraphrased by Stewart Shapiro as follows: “for any concepts F, G, the extension of F is
identical to the extension of G if and only if for every object a, Fa if and only if Ga.”16 Basic
Law V, in conjunction with the previous definition of natural numbers, allowed Frege to derive
all arithmetic using only logical laws and proofs. The apparent success of Frege’s theory
11

George Boolos, “The Standard of Equality of Numbers,” 1990, in George Boolos (ed), Meaning and
Method: Essays in Honour of Hilary Putnam, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 267
12
Frege, section 63, 73
13
Horsten, section 2.1
14
Richard G. Heck, “The Julius Caesar Objection,” 1997, in Language, Thought, and Logic: Essays in
Honour of Michael Dummett, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 274
15
Frege, section 68, 79
16
Shapiro, Thinking about Mathematics, 114
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suggested that all questions that philosophers can ask about mathematics are really questions
about logic.
In 1902 Bertrand Russell wrote to Frege to inform him that his work was inconsistent.17
The inconsistency that Russell discovered concerns Frege’s reliance on extensionality and set
theory to solve the “Caesar problem.” What is now known as Russell’s paradox shows that Basic
Law V entails a contradiction:
Let R be the concept that applies to an object x [if and only if] there is a concept F such that x is
the extension of F and Fx is false. Let r be the extension of R. Suppose Rr is true. Then there is a
concept F such that r is the extension of F and Fr is false. It follows from Basic Law V that Rr is
also false (since r is also the extension of R). Thus if Rr is true, then Rr is false. So Rr is false.
Then there is a concept F (namely R) such that r is the extension of F and Fr is false. So, by
definition, R holds of r, and so Rr is true.18

In either case, we have that Rr is both true and false, a contradiction. Set theory allows for the
formation of self-referring sets, but these sets always result in a contradiction when Basic Law V
is applied. For example, let S be the set of all sets that do not contain themselves. Suppose S is
itself a member of S. Then S contains itself hence S is not a member of S. If S is not a member of
S, however, S does not contain itself. By the definition of S, S is a member of S. Therefore, S is
both a member of itself and not a member of itself. Such self-referencing definitions are called
impredicative. There was no obvious way for Frege to disallow impredicative cases without
invoking intuition. His attempt at reducing mathematics to logic failed.
Russell, however, was not so quick to think that logicism was doomed. He noticed that
the reason for the paradox was due to the impredicative definition of the concept R. R is defined
with reference to any concept F, including itself. Russell considered circular, impredicative

17

Bertrand Russell, “Letter to Frege,” 1902, in Jean van Heijenoort, From Frege to Gödel: A Source Book
in Mathematical Logic (1879-1931), 1967, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 124-125, cited in Horsten, section
2.1
18
Shapiro, Thinking about Mathematics, 114

Maffit – 5

statements absurd. 19 Instead of dismissing Basic Law V, Russell wanted to restrict the definition
of R in such a way as to keep it from referring to itself. He created a supposedly non-intuitive
way to exclude the problematic R—his ramified type structure of sets.20 In this structure,
different types of sets are assigned levels. Level 0 are mathematical entities and their properties,
level 1 sets are those that contain level 0 entities, level 2 sets are those that contain level 1 sets,
and so on.21 This way of defining sets is predicative. That is, it does not allow for members of a
set to share properties with the set itself.
Using this structure forced Russell to redefine the natural numbers, as Frege’s definition
caused them to be of different types.22 According to Russell, “a number is anything which is the
number of some class [or set]…The number of a class is the class of all those classes that are
similar to it.”23 Thus 0 is the set of all sets with no members, 1 is the set of all sets with one
member, and so on. Since each number is the set of a set of level 0 entities, all natural numbers
are level 2 sets.
Russell’s theory of types is not without problems. It allows that there exist only as many
numbers as there are individual members that can belong to a set. David Hilbert noted that the
universe is likely neither infinitely large nor infinitely divisible.24 Since there may be only a
finite number of entities, it is not necessarily the case that there are infinite natural numbers, as
mathematicians have proven. While some radical philosophers of mathematics—the strict
finitists—would allow for the finitude of natural numbers, the majority cannot accept this

19

Bertrand Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, 1919, London, Allen & Unwin cited in
Shapiro, Thinking about Mathematics, 116
20
Horsten, section 2.1
21
Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, cited in Shapiro, Thinking about Mathematics, 117.
22
Shapiro, Thinking about Mathematics, 118
23
Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, 19
24
David Hilbert , “On the Infinite,” 1925, in Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam (ed), Philosophy of
Mathematics: Selected Readings, 2nd ed., 1983, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 186

Maffit – 6

possibility.25 Thus Russell’s theory was widely thought to have failed to provide an adequate
logicist theory of mathematics.

Intuitionism
Intuitionism is the theory that mathematical objects are abstract concepts, and mathematical
operations and principles are mental constructions on these objects.26 L.E.J. Brouwer, the
founder of modern intuitionism, was an anti-realist about ontology and did not believe that the
truth-value of mathematical statements derived from metaphysics. 27 He asserted that
mathematics is a function of the mind—a way to interpret sense data. From Stewart Shapiro’s
perspective of Brouwer, “to think at all is to think in mathematical terms.”28 That is, Brouwer
believed that intuition about mathematics begins with temporal perception. The world is
understood as a discrete sequence of moments. The set of natural numbers can be abstracted by
counting this sequence of discrete moments.29 The sets of rational numbers (includes negative
numbers and fractions) and real numbers (includes rational numbers and non-repeating decimals)
are derived from the notion of “between” natural numbers. Arithmetic, real analysis, and
geometry can all be derived in this manner.
One important result of rejecting platonic realism is that the law of excluded middle, ‘A
or ⌐A’, and its equivalents have no metaphysical basis. Arend Heyting, a student of Brouwer,
formalized intuitionist logic without relying on such laws.30 In Heyting’s formalization what is
allowed to be considered a proof of a proposition is determined by a set of rules. In Shapiro’s

25

Jean Paul Van Bendegem, “A Defense of Strict Finitism,” 2012, in Constructivist Foundations 7, 141
Horsten, section 2.2
27
Shapiro, Thinking about Mathematics, 175
28
Ibid.
29
L.E.J. Brouwer, “Intuitionism and Formalism,” 1912, in Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam (ed),
Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings, 2nd ed., 1983, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 80
30
Shapiro, Thinking about Mathematics, 185
26
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words, for example, “a proof of a sentence of the form ‘there is an x such that Φ(x)’ consists of
the construction of an item n and a proof of the corresponding Φ(n),” where n has the property
Φ.31 Intuitionists only allow for existence statements that include constructive proofs which
provide either an example of an n such that Φ(n), or a method for deriving such an n. Existence,
therefore, is synonymous with constructability.32 Intuitionist mathematicians are restricted to
working with only these constructive proofs.
Classically, mathematicians are not as restrictive and accept non-constructive proofs. One
simple example is the proof of the following proposition:
There exist non-rational [cannot be written as a fraction] numbers a and b such that ab is rational.
Proof. Take b = √2; so b is irrational. Either √2√2 is rational, or it is not. If it is, then set a = √2.
On the other hand, if √2√2 is irrational, then take a = √2√2, which makes ab = 2 and thus rational.
In either case, the conclusion holds.33

This proof does not show which of the two choices for a makes ab rational. It neither constructs
an example nor provides a method for constructing an example of irrational numbers with said
property. Therefore, this does not count as a proof for the intuitionist. Note that the pivotal
premise that ‘√2√2 is either rational or not’ relies on the law of excluded middle. In order to
satisfy the intuitionists, much of classical mathematics must undergo expansion to include the
neglected constructions or be revised to make it possible for construction to occur. It is not clear
that all statements of mathematics can be revised in such a manner.
Brouwer does allow for classical mathematics to be used for science. However, he claims
that it is less true than intuitionist mathematics due to its platonic assumptions. 34 Brouwer’s
demotion of mathematics used in science presents a problem for W.V.O Quine’s claim that
31

Shapiro, Thinking about Mathematics, 186
Arend Heyting, “Disputation,” 1956, in Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam (ed), Philosophy of
Mathematics: Selected Readings, 2nd ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 67
33
McKubre-Jordens, section 1a
34
Brouwer “Consciousness, Philosophy, 1948, in Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam (ed), Philosophy of
Mathematics: Selected Readings, 2nd ed., 1983, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,and Mathematics,” 90
32
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scientific theories are currently the epitome of rationality.35 Moreover, James Brown notes that
there are cases of useful scientific theories that cannot be revised to suit constructivist
mathematics.36 For example, suppose a physicist wants to check whether a remotely detonated
bomb has discharged. The detonation signal will activate at temperature T. At time t1, the
physicist measures the temperature to be less than T. At time t2, the temperature is measured to
be greater than T. Assume that temperature changes continuously. The intermediate value
theorem,37 accepted in classical mathematics, allows the physicist to surmise that there was a
time t between t1 and t2 when the temperature was T. This implies that the bomb has indeed
detonated. In order to construct this time t, the physicist would need to take an infinite number of
temperature measurements between t1 and t2. Since this is impossible, an intuitionist physicist
cannot make any claim as to whether or not the bomb received the signal and was detonated.
While it may not have concerned Brouwer, it appears as though contemporary science and
intuitionism are at odds if not incompatible.

Formalism
Formalism is the theory that mathematics is a formal procedure of symbol manipulation.38 In this
procedure, mathematical objects are mathematical symbols whose manipulation is determined by
rules and axioms.39 David Hilbert crafted a version of formalism, known as deductivism, in
which the symbols of mathematics make no reference to ‘real’ objects.40 Any interpretation of

35

W.V.O. Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized,” 1969, in W.V.O. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other
Essays, New York, Columbia University Press, cited in Horsten, section 3.2
36
James Robert Brown, “Science and Constructive Mathematics,” 2003, in Analysis 63, 49
37
“If f is a continuous real-valued function on an interval I, then…whenever a,b ∈ I, a<b and y lies between
f(a) and f(b)…there exists at least one x in (a,b) such that f(x)=y.” Kenneth A. Ross, Elementary Analysis: The
Theory of Calculus, 2nd Ed., 2013, New York, Springer, 134
38
Shapiro, Thinking about Mathematics, 144
39
Ibid., 142
40
Ibid., 149
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the symbols could be considered correct if the axioms correctly describe it. The number
theorist’s job is to develop theorems based on a set of axioms and definitions. Since theorems
relating to the prime numbers, for example, fit well within the framework of programming, the
computer scientist uses them to enhance computer security.41 However, any application of
mathematical theorems is inconsequential to the mathematician. Deductivism also asserts that
knowledge of mathematics is knowledge of the rules of a procedure. For Hilbert, these rules
amount to the laws of logic.42 Hilbert does allow one small role for intuition—motivation for
axiom choice. Since axioms cannot be proven, they cannot follow from a procedure. For Hilbert,
axiom choice is outside the subject of mathematics.
Since mathematics does not depend on a particular material interpretation, the truth value
of mathematical statements is tied to their consistency within a system.43 Early on, formalists had
managed to describe the systems with such rigor that they could be studied as mathematical
objects themselves. Any operations performed on the systems taken as objects are considered
meta-operations or meta-mathematics. According to Hilbert, using meta-mathematics to prove
that a set of axioms is consistent is enough to guarantee that all statements within the system
should be considered to be true.44
Hilbert’s goal was to develop a program that would “establish once and for all the
certitude of mathematical methods.”45 His program, as Johann von Neumann notes, consisted of

41

Kenneth H. Rosen, Elementary Number Theory and Its Applications, 6th ed, 2011, Boston, AddisonWesley, 291-346
42
Shapiro, Thinking about Mathematics, 159
43
David Hilbert, Foundations of Geometry, 1899, E. Townsend (trans), La Salle, Open Court, cited in
Shapiro, Thinking about Mathematics, 156
44
Ibid.
45
Hilbert, “On the Infinite,” 184

Maffit – 10

four steps.46 First, the symbols to be used within the system are specified.47 For example, the
symbol ‘+’ is used in arithmetic. Second, formulas, or rules for symbol usage, are developed.48 It
is important to define how ‘+’ will be used in certain circumstances. When adding natural
numbers, a sentence like ‘12++’ has no meaning, while a sentence like ‘16+2=20’ does. At this
stage, the truth value of the sentence is unimportant. Step three determines a formula
construction method using deductive reasoning; that is, it develops proofs.49 The final task is to
show that formulas can be proven if and only if they are true.50 Statements that are not consistent
with the system are discarded as false. Until a system can be shown to be consistent within its
own language it cannot be accepted.51
Hilbert’s program was developed with finitary mathematics in mind. He did not believe
that space and time were infinitely large nor infinitely divisible, and he wanted his mathematics
to reflect the universe’s finitude.52 Since meta-mathematics has a real subject matter, and the real
universe is finite, it was necessary for Hilbert to introduce the notion of ‘finitary mathematics’ to
describe it. For Hilbert, a finite statement is any statement whose quantifiers are bounded in
some way. Stewart Shapiro offers an example of the distinction between bounded and
unbounded quantifiers:
(1) There is a number p greater than 100 and less than 101! + 2 such that p is prime. 53
(2) There is a number p greater than 100 such that both p and p + 2 are prime.54

46

Johann von Neumann “The Formalist Foundations of Mathematics,” 1931, in Paul Benacerraf and
Hilary Putnam (ed), Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings, 2 nd ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 63
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid.
49
Ibid.
50
Ibid.
51
Hilbert, Foundations of Geometry, cited in Shapiro, Thinking about Mathematics, 156
52
Hilbert, “On the Infinite,”186
53
“The number 101! is the result of multiplying 1, 2, 3, …, 101.” Shapiro, Thinking about Mathematics,
159
54
Ibid.
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The first statement is bounded by the number 101! + 2, which is a number far too large to
calculate by hand. Fortunately, Hilbert only requires that a bound be calculable in principle.
Statement (2), on the other hand, has no bound.
Ultimately, Hilbert’s program has been very useful in the standardization of
contemporary mathematics.55 It is unfortunate, then, that Hilbert’s program was condemned to
failure. Kurt Gödel proved two incompleteness theorems, showing that the fourth task of the
program was impossible to actualize. The key insight has been summarized simply by Panu
Raatikainen as follows:
First incompleteness theorem
Any consistent formal system F within which a certain amount of elementary arithmetic can be
carried out is incomplete; i.e., there are statements of the language of F which can neither be
proved nor disproved in F.
Second incompleteness theorem
For any consistent system F within which a certain amount of elementary arithmetic can be
carried out, the consistency of F cannot be proved in F itself.56

This ‘certain amount’ of elementary arithmetic is what is needed to derive the other branches of
mathematics. Gödel’s first theorem shows that Hilbert would always be unsuccessful at finding
the consistencies of at least some statements—in particular self-referring statements—in
arithmetic. Thus, he would be unable to show that those statements were consistent in the other
systems of mathematics as they are based on arithmetic. Hilbert takes a statement’s consistency
within a system to be its truth value, so it is impossible for him to show that truth is a sufficient
condition for proof.57 He is unable to complete the fourth step in his program. Hilbert also
requires each system to be proven consistent within its own language. Therefore, Gödel’s second
theorem shows that Hilbert could not accept any non-trivial system as mathematics.

55
56

Shapiro, Thinking about Mathematics, 158
Panu Raatikainen “Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems,” 2015, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,

section 1.1
57

Hilbert, Foundations of Geometry, cited in Shapiro, Thinking about Mathematics, 156
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Platonism
Platonism is the theory that takes mathematical objects to exist as abstract entities that are
independent of human thought.58 In considering their mind-independence, Kurt Gödel compares
mathematical objects to physical objects. 59 Natural physical objects are discovered through
observation; they are not human inventions. Although each subject may perceive them
differently, physical objects present themselves to everyone in the same way. Humans have ideas
of physical objects, but their existence is not exhausted by these ideas. Gödel concludes that
mathematical objects are similar to natural objects in that they are discovered through
observation, presented objectively, and existentially independent of perception. To illustrate this
existential independence, for example, if five apples have fallen from a tree, the fact that the tree
is now growing five fewer apples does not rely on there being someone around to observe this
fact.
Mathematical intuition is analogous to the notion of ‘perception’ of physical objects.60
Perceiving the physical correspondence of the five apples to five oranges, the gatherer becomes
aware of the mathematical similarities between them. This person has thus been introduced to the
notion of ‘fiveness’ that existed before her awareness of it. Once the gatherer has discovered
‘fiveness,’ she can then discover its properties by analogy with physical processes. If she takes
two oranges from one tree and three oranges from another, she can learn that these two quantities
grouped together make five, no matter what it is that she is grouping.

58

Julian C. Cole, “Mathematical Platonism,” 2010, in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, section 1
Kurt Gödel, “Russell’s Mathematical Logic,” 1944, in Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam (ed),
Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings, 2nd ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, cited in Horsten,
section 3.1
60
Kurt Gödel, “What is Cantor’s Continuum Problem?” 1947, in Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam (ed),
Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings, 2nd ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, cited in Horsten,
section 3.1
59
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Sensory perception and mathematical intuition are also both fallible.61 The gatherer could
pick five apples, drop one without noticing, quickly glance at her bounty, and deduce that she
has enough to give one to each of her five children. She has made a perceptual error in not
noticing the dropping of an apple, and an error in mathematical intuition in thinking that each of
her children will receive an apple.
Gödel also points out a difference between mathematical and physical objects.62
Mathematical objects do not exist spatially or temporally; they are abstract. The gatherer can
notice that many groups of objects have five members, but she can never isolate the ‘fiveness’
sensorily from the group and inspect it alone.
An epistemological problem, as noted by Paul Benacerraf, arises when claiming that
mathematical objects are abstract.63 If human beings are purely physical and mathematical
objects are purely abstract, then humans cannot causally interact with mathematical objects.
Thus, platonists must come up with an explanation of how knowledge of mathematical objects is
obtained. One potential solution, plenitudinous platonism, attempts to solve the problem by not
requiring a causal relationship.64 In this view, “all consistent candidates for mathematical
theories are true” even if humans cannot access their objects.65 Mark Balaguer argues that
consistency, or obtainable justification, is enough to set platonists free from needing to bridge the
impossibly wide gap between the world of mathematical objects and the physical world. Each
theory necessarily refers to its own universe.66 The mathematical realm is large enough to

61

Ibid.
Gödel, “Russell’s Mathematical Logic,” cited in Horsten section 3.1
63
Paul Benacerraf “Mathematical Truth,” 1973, in Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam (ed), Philosophy of
Mathematics: Selected Readings, 2nd ed., 1983, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 415
64
Mark Balaguer, Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics, 1998, Oxford, Oxford University Press,
cited in Horsten, section 3.5
65
Mary Leng, “Platonism and Anti-Platonism: Why Worry?” 2005, in International Studies in the
Philosophy of Science 19, 68
66
Balaguer, cited in Horsten, section 3.5
62
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contain any and all objects with the properties seen in typical mathematical statements, and it
does so as long as these objects are justifiably used within a given theory.67 In other words,
mathematicians are free to assume that any mathematical object of their liking exists, as long as
it is logically possible for it to exist in a given theory. That pi is the ratio of a circle’s
circumference to its diameter is verifiable within Euclidean geometry, for example, so pi itself
does exist even if humans cannot access its essence. Hence, mathematicians gain knowledge
about mathematical objects by creating consistent theories about them.
Benacerraf noticed a second problem with platonism, called the “identification problem”
that can be illustrated with the following example.68 Where 0 = ∅, the empty set, the natural
numbers can be defined within set theory in both of the following ways:
(i) [∅], [[∅]], [[[∅]]], …
and
(ii) [∅], [∅, [∅]], [∅, [∅], [∅, [∅]]], …69

Since platonism is a form of realism, and realists claim that propositions correspond with the
unique, independent reality, there should be only one way of defining the natural numbers.70
Therefore, if definitions (i) and (ii) differ in some way, they cannot both be correct. In this case,
the sets are isomorphic in arithmetic, meaning that all arithmetic operations performed under
definition (i) yield the same answers as when they are performed under definition (ii). However,
in more complex mathematical systems they exhibit differences. For example, the number 3 in
definition (i)—[[[∅]]]—contains one element but in definition (ii)—[∅, [∅], [∅, [∅]]]—contains
three elements. Platonism requires there to be only one correct definition of natural numbers.
However, it does not provide a criterion for which of these definitions, if either, to pick.
67

Balaguer, cited in Cole, section 4
Paul Benacerraf, “What Numbers Could Not Be,” 1965, in Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam (ed),
Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings, 2nd ed., 1983, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 279
69
Benacerraf, “What Numbers Could Not Be,” 278
70
Lee Braver A Thing of This World: A History of Continental Anti-Realism, 2007, St. Evanston, IL,
Northwestern University Press, 15-17
68

Maffit – 15

Despite possible difficulties with platonism, the Quine-Putnam Indispensability
Argument (QPIA)71, shows that platonism is essential to scientific realism. The QPIA is
summarized in the following argument:
1. If a scientific theory is true, then the mathematical entities that it employs exist.
2. Some scientific theories are true.
3. Therefore, the mathematical entities employed by those true scientific theories exist. 72
This argument assumes a background of scientific realism, which is the attitude that science
attempts to describe the physical world as it really is.73 Under realism, protons, neutrons, and
electrons are real physical objects. It should be noted that the QPIA does not affect theoretical
mathematics, only mathematics applied to scientific theories. In fact, Øystein Linnebo holds that
theoretical mathematicians speak as though mathematical objects exist, but whether they, in fact,
exist does not affect their work.74 If platonism were false, nothing would change for them.
However, science would be viewed very differently. By the QPIA, if scientific realism is true,
then platonism is also true.75 To illustrate this, consider Newton’s second law of physics
according to which: “the change of motion is proportional to the motive force impressed; and is
made in the direction of the right line in which that force is impressed.”76 This law is known in
physics by the formula F=ma, where F is the sum of forces acting on an object, m is the mass of
the object, and a is the acceleration of the object. Newton’s formulation of the law does not
overtly refer to mathematical objects. However, forces, masses, and accelerations are real
71

Developed by Quine and Hilary Putnam in Hilary Putnam, Philosophy of Logic, 1972, London, Allen &
Unwin, cited in Horsten, section 3.2
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number magnitudes with forces and accelerations being tied to some direction. To use Newton’s
second law or to say it represents reality is in some sense to say that real numbers exist. To say
that a real number exists is to say that platonism is true. If platonism is false, then, by simple
modus tollens, scientific realism must also be false:
1. If scientific realism is true, then platonism is true.
2.

Platonism is false.

3. Therefore, scientific realism is false.
In the words of Putnam, it follows that “the success of science [would be] a miracle.”77

Structuralism
Structuralism, a theory backed by Stewart Shapiro and Paul Benacerraf, states that mathematical
objects exist only as relationships within their systems.78 For example, the natural number three
is nothing more or less than its relation to the other natural numbers—one more than two, half of
six, eight less than eleven, etc. In structuralist terminology, a system is any set of related objects.
Mathematics is the study of the forms of relatedness that are abstracted from these systems,
“highlighting the interrelationships among the objects, and ignoring any features of them that do
not affect how they relate to other objects in the system.”79 These abstracted forms of
mathematical study are called ‘structures.’ Structuralists do not believe that it is possible to
discuss a mathematical object without at least implicitly referring to the structure in which it
belongs. If, for example, one tried to divide three by two, the answer would make sense in the
rational number structure since this structure contains all numbers that can be written as
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fractions, but it would not make sense in the natural number structure, which consists of nonnegative whole numbers. Any system that permits this division cannot be an instance of the
natural numbers structure. Rules of the structure determine which actions are allowed. All
mathematics requires an implicit understanding of which structure is controlling the relation of
objects.
Shapiro characterizes his position as “ante rem structuralism.” As such, he believes that
structures exist independently of and before the systems they instantiate.80 This characterization
puts him in a similar ontological position to the mathematical platonists. Ante rem structuralists,
however, do not accept the platonist’s idea of a universal’s “explanatory primacy.” A platonist
would claim that a circle is round because it instantiates the universal ‘roundness.’ Shapiro states
that ante rem structuralists “do not hold, for example, that a given system is a model of the
natural numbers because it exemplifies the natural number structure.…What makes a system
exemplify the natural number structure is that it is a model of arithmetic.”81
Since ante rem structuralism is so similar to platonic realism, it must find a way to
overcome the problems faced by platonists. Benacerraf’s identification problem (described above
in the platonism section) shows that two unique and incompatible set-theoretic systems of natural
numbers can be instantiated by the natural number structure.82 Asking a question about the settheoretic properties of an arbitrary element in this structure can result in two different answers
depending on which system is chosen. Structuralism dictates that the structure of natural
numbers instantiates both set-theoretic systems, but neither system is identical to its structure.83
Thus, Shapiro claims that asking questions external to a structure or even comparing systems that
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share the same structure is not cogent. Asking these sorts of questions is “similar to asking
whether the number 1 is funnier than the number 4, or greener.”84 By allowing only questions
that are internal to a given structure, ante rem structuralists are able to avoid the identification
problem altogether.
Benacerraf’s epistemological problem (described above in the platonism section) is more
difficult to solve. Since structures are abstract, non-physical entities, ante rem structuralists must
provide some explanation as to how physical beings can know them.85 Shapiro describes the
abstraction process as follows:
One first contemplates the finite cardinal structures as objects in their own right. Then we form a
system consisting of the collection of these finite structures with an appropriate order. Finally, we
discuss the structure of this system.86

Shapiro admits that this process does not resolve the epistemological problem. Ultimately,
Shapiro relies on the success of ante rem structuralism at describing classical mathematics as
evidence that structures exist.87

Moderate realism
Moderate realism is an often neglected theory that proposes that mathematical objects are minddependent concepts abstracted from physical objects that do not, however, incur subjectivity.88
That the number three can be said of the wheels of a tricycle, for example, depends on the
existence of a mind capable of abstracting three from the wheels. The threeness of the wheels
presents itself to everyone in the same way as the threeness in the vertices of a triangle. Hence,
three is the same regardless of what objects are presented as a triple. Michael Tavuzzi states that,
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for the moderate realist “the objects of mathematics are no mere arbitrary fictions—they have an
objective foundation in reality: the quantitative accidental forms of figure and number which
inhere in existing material things and which are indirect objects of the external senses.”89 This
objective foundation addresses Hilary Putnam’s concern for the miracle status of the success of
scientific prediction in non-platonic theories.90 Under moderate realism, scientific theory would
also be considered mind-dependent. It is fitting that the same abstraction process could be used
for both mathematical and scientific objects and relations. The two subjects mesh so well
together because they both have foundations in the same reality. The abstraction process also
solves Benacerraf’s epistemological problem which is concerned with how physical beings can
have knowledge of abstract objects without being able to causally interact with them.91 Since it is
the human mind that performs the abstraction, humans do have a causal influence on
mathematical objects.
Thomas Aquinas proposes a mechanism of abstraction called “simple apprehension.”92
Simple apprehension can be divided into eight steps: object, species, sense organ, impressed
species, common sense, phantasm, active intellect, and potential intellect. All knowledge begins
with objects. The species carries the intelligibility of the object to the subject. Sense organs
collect these species. The species must leave an impression behind or it will be ignored. What is
referred to as common sense notes the simultaneous agreement of the impressed species from
different senses. These impressed species form a unity called the phantasm. Drawing on
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Aristotelian doctrine,93 Aquinas proposes that part of the intellect, called the “active intellect,”
changes the passive, material phantasm to an active, immaterial intelligibility. Finally, the
potential intellect receives the abstract, active idea so that the concept is possessed by the
knower.
An observation of Stewart Shapiro about deriving the natural numbers through
abstraction could pose a problem for moderate realism.94 In order for a number to exist, it must
be able to be abstracted from some set of physical things. This implies that in order to use very
large numbers or infinity, there must be enough physical things that can be grouped in order for
someone to process the abstraction. It is not obvious that this is the case. Moreover, Tobias
Dantzig notes that humans who lack number words and counting are incapable of perceiving the
difference between groups of small numbers such as seven and eight.95 There seems to be a
numeric threshold for the mind’s ability to identify the quantity of objects in a small group. On
this account, it seems impossible for someone to be able to abstract large numbers in the first
place.
Aquinas, however, would not agree that there is a problem with large numbers. He allows
for the reflection on the active ideas acquired through simple apprehension. In fact, it is through
this reflection that people are able to discover that there exist individual objects from which
abstractions are made. 96 Dantzig notes that all humans can distinguish between one and two
even South African Bushman who only have numerical words for the concepts ‘one,’ ‘two,’ and
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‘many.’97 Thus, it is possible for everyone to abstract one and two from physical objects. From
reflection on the difference between one and two, it seems as though developing a “plus one”
principle would be the obvious next step. Then, it is only a matter of time before larger number
words and counting are established. Similar to developing large numbers, of the infinite Aquinas
states that “infinity is potentially in our mind through its considering successively one thing after
another.”98 Thus, Shapiro’s large number problem can be avoided with Aquinas’s reflection
allowance.

Criteria for Adequate Philosophy of Mathematics
In order to pick out which theories best describe current mathematical practice, a standard of
judgment must be stipulated. Michael Tavuzzi’s criteria for the acceptance of a philosophical
theory of mathematics requires the theory to include the following:
(1) The fact that doing mathematics consists largely of the rule-governed, formal, manipulation
of symbol.
(2) The fact that this seemingly mechanical manipulation of symbols is grounded in a rich
dimension of subjective construction and daring intuition which is characteristic of the
mathematical consciousness.
(3) The fact that, nonetheless, mathematical consciousness is not concerned with some
psychologistically interpreted subjective dimension but with objective truths and structures.
(4) The fact that mathematics holds of the real world and therefore must have some intimate
connection with reality.99

The necessity of criterion (1) is obvious, and all theories discussed above allow for rulegoverned symbol manipulation. Criterion (2) is slightly more controversial; not everyone agrees
that it is necessary to account for mathematical intuition. It does, however, seem uncontroversial
that mathematicians often use intuition to pose conjectures that are not yet proved or disproved.
For example, examining the early primes, 3 and 5, 5 and 7, 11 and 13, etc., one could conclude
97
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that the twin prime conjecture, that “there are infinitely many pairs of primes p and p + 2” is
intuitive.100 Daniel Shanks notes that given that there have been over one hundred thousand
confirmations of twin primes “the evidence for [the conjecture] is overwhelming.”101 However, it
remains a matter of mathematical intuition because it has not been proven. The objectivity of
mathematics from criterion (3) of Tavuzzi’s criteria appears to be mostly uncontested. This is
due in part to the existence of complex mathematics that follows from necessity from the
universally accepted fundamental arithmetic. Criterion (4) is the most disputed of Tavuzzi’s
criteria, particularly with anti-realists who do not want to make mathematics dependent on an
ontological position about reality.102 Militating against the anti-realist position, however, are the
innumerable outcomes which would be relegated to the status of coincidences by the antirealists, such as the value that the study of large prime numbers adds to computer security.103
One immediate concern with using Tavuzzi’s criteria as the standard of judgment for the
above philosophical theories is that Tavuzzi is a moderate realist and likely crafted his criteria
with his position of philosophy of mathematics in mind. Comparing Tavuzzi’s criteria with
another, more general set of criteria will showcase the level of objectivity that Tavuzzi’s criteria
employs. One such set of criteria is presented by Paul Ernest, an advocate of social
constructivism which is not discussed in this paper. In his view, any theory of mathematics must
consider the following:
1. Mathematical knowledge: its character, genesis and justification, with special attention to the
role of proof
2. Mathematical theories, both constructive and structural: their character and development, and
the issues in their appraisal and evaluation
3. The objects of mathematics: their character, origins, and relationship with the language of
mathematics
100
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4. The applications of mathematics: its effectiveness in science, technology, and other realms
and , more generally, the relationship of mathematics with other areas of knowledge and
values
5. Mathematical practice: its character, and the mathematical activities of mathematicians, in the
present and past
6. The learning of mathematics: its character, and its role in the onward transmission of
mathematical knowledge and in the creativity of individual mathematicians.104

Ernest takes criteria 1 and 3 to be trivial notions that philosophical theories in general attempt to
explain.105 The fact that Tavuzzi does not mention these criteria should not invalidate his
standard of judgment. Tavuzzi’s criterion (4) is generally equivalent to Ernest’s criterion 4, with
the stipulation that Tavuzzi is committed to the claim that we can have knowledge of reality, a
claim that Earnest does not explicitly make. The combination of Tavuzzi’s criteria (1) and (2)
comprise Ernest’s criterion (5). Criterion (3) adopted by Tavuzzi has no explicit equivalent
criterion within Ernest’s standard. It is possible that Ernest would consider Tavuzzi’s criterion
(3) covered by some combination of his other criteria, or perhaps his position is one of the few
that outright rejects mathematical objectivity. However, as mathematical theories are often
considered the most certain among the natural sciences, I will continue to consider Tavuzzi’s
criterion (3) important to any description of mathematics.106 Detailed discussion of Ernest’s
criteria 2 and 6 is outside the scope of this paper, but may prove important for future study.
Despite possible disputes regarding some of Tavuzzi’s criteria and in light of similar criteria
given by Ernest, I shall compare Tavuzzi’s criteria to the preceding philosophical theories in
order to deduce which is the best description of present-day mathematics.
As noted above, Gottlob Frege’s logicism ideally disallowed the use of intuition, going
against criterion (2).107 However, Frege was unsuccessful at eliminating paradox without relying
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on intuition, as Bertrand Russell discovered. Self-referring sets are derivable in Frege’s set
theory. However, intuition dictates that in order to make Frege’s system consistent, self-referring
sets must be excluded. The removal of self-referring sets is not mandated by principles of logic.
Russell similarly failed to describe a plausible logicist theory. His ramified type structure
requires intuition to allow for an infinite set of natural numbers. Generally speaking, these results
indicate that recourse to intuition is needed to derive infinite number from a finite universe.
Disallowing human intuition, though methodologically desirable, ultimately was the cause of
logicism’s demise.
L.E.J. Brouwer’s intuitionism opposes criteria (3) and (4). For Brouwer, mathematics is a
completely subjective process occurring entirely in the mind.108 As discussed above, the law of
excluded middle is rejected by intuitionists as being dependent on a realist view. This, however
makes the resulting mathematics incompatible with some useful scientific theories as James
Brown notes.109 Such an outcome would prompt W.V.O. Quine to say that intuitionism is the
theory at fault for being at odds with reality.110
David Hilbert’s deductive formalism was shown to be untenable as a philosophical
theory. Under Hilbert’s program, only the most trivial mathematical systems could avoid the
result of Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness theorems.111 However, much non-trivial mathematics is
quite useful, if incomplete. Presumably a correct description of reality would have to be
complete, so most of Hilbert’s theory cannot be a description of reality and is in conflict with
criterion (4).
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Both Gödel’s platonism and Stewart Shapiro’s ante rem structuralism fall prey to Paul
Benacerraf’s epistemological problem. Neither theory provides an adequate explanation as to
how humans can know abstract objects with which they have no causal relation. Mark
Balaguer’s plenitudinous platonism’s attempt at solving the problem makes platonism sound
much like Hilbert’s failed formalism. Under plenitudinous platonism, Balaguer claims that object
consistency within a theory implies object existence in some platonic realm.112 However, this
does not address Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem in which not all statements could be
proved consistent within a theory.113 Thus, Balaguer’s attempt to avoid the epistemological
problem fails in this respect. Shapiro’s attempt to describe an abstraction process, by his own
admission, also fails to solve the epistemological problem.114 Since neither platonism nor ante
rem structuralism can explain how humans know mathematical objects, the theories do not
describe the reality of the human relationship with mathematics, conflicting with criterion (4).
Platonism has another problem, Benacerraf’s identification problem, which it shares with
moderate realism. Benacerraf notes two different set-theoretic definitions of natural numbers
which both yield the same answers to all arithmetic questions, but yield different answers about
some set theory questions.115 Realists, both platonic and moderate, claim that there is one unique
reality and therefore only one definition of natural number.116 Neither platonism nor moderate
realism is capable of explaining which of the set-theoretic definitions is correct. To this extent
these theories are in conflict with criterion (4) as it is not clear which natural number definition
refers to reality, or in what sense they both do.
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A structuralist approach to solving the identification problem is to apply platonism or
moderate realism to the natural number structure, for example, instead of the natural numbers
themselves. Structuralists are able to avoid the identification problem by observing that the
structure of natural numbers instantiates both of Benacerraf’s set-theoretic definitions, but
neither definition is identical to its structure.117 Ante rem structuralism has already been
disqualified due to its conflict with criterion (4).

Moderate Realist Structuralism
What might be called “moderate realist structuralism” has not yet been synthesized as a position
in the philosophy of mathematics. Drawing on the strengths of ante rem structuralism and
moderate realism could overcome the challenges that they face individually. As noted above,
structuralism takes mathematical structures, or relations between mathematical entities to be
objects.118 Instead of taking mathematical structures to be platonic objects as ante rem realists
do, moderate realist structuralism takes mathematical structures to be moderate realist objects;
that is, they are mind-dependent abstractions formed when one recognizes some pattern in a
system of related physical objects and ignores any features unrelated to the pattern.119 For
example, in considering an analog clock, one could abstract from it the underlying group120
structure of the relationships between the numbers. Under moderate realist structuralism,
structures are concepts, but they are not subjective. They exist as the intelligibility of the
117
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relations of physical objects in a system. This intelligibility is available to be known by everyone
in the same way. The abstraction process serves as a causal gateway between physical humans
and nonphysical structures, thereby solving Benacerraf’s epistemological problem, as discussed
above in the moderate realism section.121 Also, as detailed above in the structuralism section,
taking mathematical objects to be structures frees the moderate realist from Benacerraf’s
identification problem. 122
In light of these solutions, one might consider whether this “moderate realist” or “in re”
structuralism could be a philosophical theory that does not conflict with Tavuzzi’s criteria:

(1) Moderate realist structuralism would allow for rule-governed symbol manipulation, as
moderate realism and structuralism do.
(2) The moderate realist abstraction process allows for reflection on abstractions.123 This
reflection conforms to the need for mathematical intuition.
(3) Even though the reflection is a subjective, mental practice, the abstraction process begins
in the objective reality, and mathematics has an objective subject.124
(4) Since the abstraction process begins in the objective reality, moderate realist
structuralism is fundamentally rooted in reality. By following the structuralist’s defense
against the identification problem, Benacerraf’s seemingly problematic case is avoided,
and there is no conflict regarding which of two or more incompatible instantiations of a
system is correct in representing reality.
It seems as though out of all the theories discussed, this theory is the most adherent to Tavuzzi’s
criteria.
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Despite its apparent adequacy to the above standard of judgment, moderate realist
structuralism may still face other criticisms. One possible rejection of this theory could result
from the fact that there is currently no accepted psychological account of the brain's pattern
recognition mechanism.125 For example, Aquinas's simple apprehension would not be a
satisfactory mechanism to those who identify the mind with the brain, as they would reject the
proposed immaterial steps.126 However, nothing about moderate realist structuralism requires
that simple apprehension be the adopted abstraction method. Any cogent mechanism of
abstraction that begins in the sensory world and ends with human knowledge of mathematics
could be proposed in its place.
On a similar note, one could reject that humans abstract structures in place of
mathematical objects. As Shapiro notes, “a child can learn much about the number 2 while
knowing next to nothing about other numbers like 6 or 6,000,000.”127 This appears to suggest
that the number 2 is not dependent on its place in the natural numbers structure. However, by
analogy with material objects, Shapiro notes that epistemic independence does not imply
ontological independence.128 Many drivers are unaware of their cars’ complex engine mechanics,
but the cars still depend on their engines to be drivable. It also seems as though abstracting
quantity is impossible without first noticing some difference between a single object and
multiple objects. This difference is the beginning of the structure of natural numbers.
Perhaps other criticisms could be made of moderate realist structuralism. It is beyond the
scope of this paper to attempt to address all of them. Nonetheless, it has been my aim to propose

125

Shapiro, Thinking about Mathematics, 276
Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Part I, question 85, art. 1
127
Shapiro, Thinking about Mathematics, 258
128
Ibid.
126

Maffit – 29

that of all the theories discussed, it is the most adherent to Tavuzzi's criteria and provides the
best description of current mathematical practice.

Conclusion
In this paper, I discussed six philosophical theories of mathematics and some of their
corresponding problems. Logicism takes the position that foundational mathematics is purely
about symbolic logic and logic relations. Intuitionism is an anti-realist theory that takes
mathematics to be about mental constructions. Formalism proposes that mathematical objects are
nothing more than the symbols with which they are written, with formal procedures governing
the symbol manipulation. Platonism theorizes that mathematical objects are real, mindindependent, abstract entities. Structuralism takes mathematical objects to be relationships within
structures. Moderate realism appropriates mathematical objects as objective, mind-dependent,
abstractions from material objects.
None of these theories is without criticism. Logicism incurs Russell’s paradox.
Intuitionism is at odds with scientific theory. Formalism breaks down in view of Gödel’s
incompleteness theorems. Platonism and ante rem structuralism incur Benacerraf’s
epistemological problem. Moreover, platonism and moderate realism incur Benacerraf’s
identification problem, and moderate realism is left to overcome the problem of providing an
accepting psychological account of the brain’s mechanism of pattern recognition. Combining
moderate realism with structuralism, however, seems to yield a theory which is able to overcome
these problems.
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The preceding has been an attempt to evaluate various philosophical theories of
mathematics and select the option that best describes current mathematical practice. It does not
presume to have presented every theory nor to have addressed every problem that could arise for
the theories presented. However, it does claim to have treated problems that any philosophical
theory of mathematics will need to address, and proposes an avenue towards a solution to these
problems.
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